Performance Characterization of GNSS/IMU/DVL Integration under Real Maritime Jamming Conditions by Ziebold, Ralf et al.
sensors
Article
Performance Characterization of GNSS/IMU/DVL
Integration under Real Maritime Jamming Conditions
Ralf Ziebold 1,* , Daniel Medina 1 , Michailas Romanovas 2, Christoph Lass 1 and
Stefan Gewies 1
1 German Aerospace Center (DLR), Institute of Communications and Navigation, Neustrelitz 17235, Germany;
daniel.ariasmedina@dlr.de (D.M.); christoph.lass@dlr.de (C.L.); stefan.gewies@dlr.de (S.G.)
2 BASELABS GmbH, Chemnitz 09126, Germany; michailas.romanovas@baselabs.de
* Correspondence: ralf.ziebold@dlr.de
Received: 14 June 2018; Accepted: 3 September 2018; Published: 5 September 2018


Abstract: Currently Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are the primary source for the
determination of absolute position, navigation, and time (PNT) for merchant vessel navigation.
Nevertheless, the performance of GNSSs can strongly degrade due to space weather events, jamming,
and spoofing. Especially the increasing availability and adoption of low cost jammers lead to
the question of how a continuous provision of PNT data can be realized in the vicinity of these
devices. In general, three possible solutions for that challenge can be seen: (i) a jamming-resistant
GNSS receiver; (ii) the usage of a terrestrial backup system; or (iii) the integration of GNSS
with other onboard navigation sensors such as a speed log, a gyrocompass, and inertial sensors
(inertial measurement unit—IMU). The present paper focuses on the third option by augmenting
a classical IMU/GNSS sensor fusion scheme with a Doppler velocity log. Although the benefits of
integrated IMU/GNSS navigation system have been already demonstrated for marine applications,
a performance evaluation of such a multi-sensor system under real jamming conditions on a vessel
seems to be still missing. The paper evaluates both loosely and tightly coupled fusion strategies
implemented using an unscented Kalman filter (UKF). The performance of the proposed scheme is
evaluated using the civilian maritime jamming testbed in the Baltic Sea.
Keywords: maritime navigation; GNSS; GNSS jamming; integrated navigation systems; Kalman
filtering; Doppler velocity log; inertial sensors
1. Introduction
Maritime transport plays a key role in the global trade with nearly 80% of commodity volumes and
70% of commodity values being transported by sea [1]. The increasing transport volume leads not only
to rapidly growing vessel dimensions but also to an increase of traffic densities especially in coastal
areas and port entrances. Here reliable and accurate navigational information is required to avoid
situations that could compromise the safety of the ship, crew, and the environment. Currently, Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs), and particularly GPS, are the main source for the provision of
absolute position, navigation, and precise time (PNT) information for maritime navigation. A large
number of systems and functionalities onboard a vessel, such as the Electronic Chart Display and
Information System (ECDIS), the Automatic Identification System (AIS), and the Automatic Track
Control just to name a few, are strongly dependent on the provision of accurate PNT information.
Furthermore, as first conceptual studies and demonstration projects have been started with the aim to
development fully autonomous vessels [2], the need for accurate and reliable PNT will increase even
further in the future.
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This dependency on GNSS has raised serious concerns on the vulnerability of the navigation
process [3,4]. As the GNSS signals are very weak (≈–125 dBm) when arriving to the receivers on the
Earth’s surface, they become relatively susceptible to possible radio interference. Currently, a noticeable
increase in intentional and unintentional radio frequency interference (RFI) in GNSS bands is observed.
The act of intentionally directing powerful electromagnetic waves toward a victim’s receiver aiming to
deny its operations is called jamming [5]. Especially the availability of cheap jamming devices such as
Personal Privacy Devices (PPDs) has been widely recognized as a real threat to GNSS applications.
One of a typical jammer’s application scenario is to dodge the unwanted tracking, e.g., as used in
illegal fishing or by the drivers working overlong hours. In Newark, NJ, USA, the operation of an
aviation ground-based augmentation system was disturbed by a PPD jammer used by a truck driver,
regularly passing a road close to the airport [6]. Just recently, an international measurement campaign
studying radio frequency interference (RFI) in the L1/E1 and L5/E5a bands on a container vessel
was performed [7]. This study reports how frequent RFI events occur, even making the GNSS service
unavailable in some cases. Moreover, South Korea has also repeatedly reported jamming attacks from
North Korea, heavily affecting the maritime transport [8].
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognized the importance of resilient onboard
provision of PNT data, and the development of Guidelines for an onboard PNT (data processing)
unit has been identified as supplementary and necessary. The German Aerospace Center (DLR) has
developed a concept for such a PNT unit [9] and was actively involved in the development of a
corresponding guideline at the IMO, which has been finally approved in June 2017 by the IMO [10].
The basic idea behind the concept of the PNT data processing unit is to develop a scalable approach for
a combined and harmonized usage of all available onboard sensors using the methods of multi-sensor
and information fusion.
In general, one can distinguish three main groups of solutions that can be used for mitigation of
GNSS jamming. Within the methods of the first group, the impact of jamming is mitigated inside the
GNSS receiver by techniques such as adaptive notch filtering, pulse blanking, or adaptive beamforming
using a multi-antenna GNSS receiver [11–13]. Within the second group, alternative terrestrial radio
navigation systems are employed to enable a position determination independently from GNSS.
However, after the decommission of LORAN-C (eLoran) in the US as well as in Europe, no global
operational backup exists anymore. For maritime application, the so-called R-Mode (R-Ranging) is
currently being developed as a terrestrial backup system. Here existing signals of opportunity of
globally available maritime infrastructure such as MF radio beacons and ashore AIS stations will be
used as possible ranging sources [14]. A first experimental testbed for R-Mode will be established in
the R-Mode Baltic project (2017–2020) in the western part of the Baltic Sea [15]. Finally, within the third
group, the positioning information from the GNSS receiver is combined within a multi-sensor fusion
scheme with independent onboard sensors such as inertial sensors, a speed log, or a gyrocompass.
Such hybrid navigation systems enable PNT determination even in cases where GNSS information are
either not available or not sufficient for a complete solution.
The present paper focuses on an example from the third group, where a classical inertial
measurement unit (IMU)/GNSS sensor fusion scheme is augmented with a Doppler velocity log (DVL).
Although the benefits of integrated IMU/GNSS navigation systems have already been demonstrated
for marine applications [16], a performance test of such a multi-sensor system under real jamming
conditions on a vessel is still missing. Typically, the GNSS outage is only emulated by switching the
GNSS signals off instantaneously, whereas within a real jamming scenario a complete GNSS outage
is only the final stage after a slow degradation of GNSS signal reception. The crucial point is the
correct description of the GNSS measurement error statistics under jamming conditions. Whenever
the GNSS noise model assumptions are violated, the Kalman filter (KF) could behave suboptimally
and therefore could result in inferior performance compared to that which is often demonstrated
using pure simulated data. Typically, it is expected that the jamming leads to an increased range noise
and might even result in failures in signal tracking loops. Therefore, the characterization of GNSS
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pseudorange errors statistics under jamming conditions is a prerequisite of using an IMU/DVL/GNSS
integration in a real jamming scenario.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief overview of existing work on
jamming experiments and the application of hybrid navigation systems for maritime applications
is given. The details of the applied GNSS/IMU/DVL unscented KF are given in Section 3 and are
followed by the description of the experimental setup of the measurement campaign in Section 4.
The results are presented and discussed in Section 5, and a summary and outlook for future work are
provided in Section 6.
2. Previous Work
The emerging of safety-critical applications subject to accurate GNSS positioning and timing,
such as autonomous cars or assisted landing, has urged the GNSS community into identifying jamming
as one of the major menaces [17–19]. Thus, lately there have been numerous studies related to
detecting and counteracting the impact of jamming attacks. In [20], the performance of a broad range
of consumer grade GPS receivers under the interference of a low cost PPD is analyzed. The test was
carried out for a static scenario within a confined space, where the performance of the receiver in
terms of positioning accuracy and solution availability was analyzed for both the jamming-free and
jamming scenarios of different intensities. Surprisingly, the tested receivers coped properly with
the interference during the light jamming attack (with a jamming-to-signal ratio of 15 dB) with only
a marginal influence on the quality of the position solution. However, during the severe jamming
attack (jamming-to-noise-ratio of 25 dB), the availability of the position solution was reduced by more
than 75%, while the positioning accuracy heavily degraded. It appears that jamming merely introduces
additional noise in the measured pseudoranges, while the positioning degradation occurs under
powerful interference due to the loss of satellite signal track and a consequent poor satellite geometry.
A series of works addressing the impact of jamming attacks on the maritime navigation has
been recently presented. For example, a trial was conducted on the East coast of United Kingdom
using a professional L1 band jammer [21]. This study evaluated the jamming impact on the safety of
maritime navigation and the quality of on-shore services such as vessel traffic management. The lack
of GNSSs triggers numerous alarms and failures of interfaces (like the ECDIS) on the bridge of
the vessel, causing discomfort to a vessel crew that additionally needs to face the challenge of quickly
reverting to traditional means of navigation. This study nicely underlines the necessity for a backup
for GNSS-based positioning on board a vessel.
Subsequently, a jamming experiment was carried out in the north of Norway using a broadband
(bandwidth ≈ 60 MHz) jammer, centered at GPS L1 frequency and affecting the GLONASS primary
frequencies [22]. The main experimental finding was that GLONASS G1 tracking remained more
resistant to jamming than GPS L1. This finding could, however, have been caused by the fact that
GLONASS G1 frequencies lie at the edge of the reported jammer bandwidth, and the effective
jammer-to-signal power in that band could already be significantly lower than for GPS L1. The primary
output of the work was the suggestion for the maritime community to update their GNSS receivers to
modern multi-constellation and multi-frequency ones. While this might be a solution for some type
of jammers, currently, there are already PPD jammers on the market being able to jam all relevant
GNSS frequencies.
One of the typical approaches to bridge short GNSS outages is to combine GNSS information
with that from an inertial measurement unit (IMU). The inertial sensors measure the relative state of
the object with respect to the inertial navigation frame and have distinct advantages, such as being
self-contained, immune to interference, and highly dynamical. Unfortunately, these systems provide
only incremental information and the integration outputs drift over time when no external reference
is provided [23]. An early work [16] assessed the potential application of IMU/GNSS integration for
maritime navigation using a loosely coupled KF. A collection of IMUs of different grade was employed
to characterize the position drift over time of the hybrid navigation system when the GNSS service was
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artificially disabled. Although the performance of the inertial sensors was relatively good, the authors
concluded that, despite the tangible advantages from the usage of IMU, inertial sensors still could not
be considered as a primary backup to GNSS due to their fast position drift even when high-priced
navigation sensors are employed. This statement is corroborated by our recent work [24], where the
performance of a hybrid IMU/GNSS system in maritime applications was also evaluated, including
modern affordable tactical grade MEMS inertial sensors.
Another sensor typically used in maritime applications is the Doppler velocity log (DVL).
When mounted on a vessel, the sensor faces the sea floor and can provide very accurate velocity
information of the vessel with respect to the sea floor [25] for scenarios up to a certain depth.
The working principle of a DVL is rather simple. Firstly, an oscillating acoustic signal is sent out along
each of the transducer axes. From the frequency shift between the emitted and the returned signal,
the velocity along each of the transducer axis is determined. Despite being commonly mounted
on marine vehicles ranging from large ships to small autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs),
there is a scarcity of academic resources concerning the specifics and functionality of DVLs [26].
The combined usage of DVL and IMU have been reported in a number of works [27–29] for the
navigation AUVs, although only in few works has it been applied to merchant vessels [30], and none
have reported the performance of a hybrid IMU/GNSS/DVL navigation system. In a previous work
[31], the performance of the navigation solution fusing IMU, GNSS, and DVL was demonstrated on a
maritime scenario. However, the performance characterization under actual GNSS jamming conditions
has not yet been realized.
3. Methods
The proposed hybrid navigation system employs the recursive Bayesian estimation (RBE)
framework to combine the outputs of several sensors in order to obtain a single navigation solution.
The RBE methods deal with the problem of estimating the changing-in-time state of the system
applying a priori information about the underlying system dynamics and the observations from the
sensors. The probabilistic paradigm has been widely applied to navigation and tracking problems,
given its ability to accommodate inaccurate models as well as imperfect sensors [32].
In general, any RBE cycle is performed in two steps:
Prediction: The a priori probability is calculated from the last a posteriori probability using the
available process model.
Correction: The a posteriori probability is calculated from the a priori probability using the
measurement model and the current measurements.
Among the multiple RBE methods, the Kalman filter (KF) is probably the most well-known
solution for the navigation problem. The original KF provides an optimal solution when the models
are linear and the probabilities are Gaussian. However, when dealing with nonlinearities in the models,
as is often the case for positioning problems, nonlinear extensions of KF such as the extended KF (EKF)
or the unscented KF (UKF) can be used. In the case of the EKF, the nonlinear models are linearized
around the most recent state estimate, while in the UKF the probability distribution is approximated
using a set of deterministically chosen (non-randomly sampled) points in the state space, where every
sample is assigned a particular fixed weight. This set of points conserves the Gaussian properties of
the distribution under nonlinear transformations [33].
Although the EKF has been for a long time considered as a de facto standard for tracking
applications [34], the UKF has emerged as an alternative, claiming even higher accuracy and robustness
for nonlinear models [35]. The UKF employs the statistical linearization techniques and implements
the scaled unscented transform (UT), where carefully selected samples of the state are propagated
through the actual nonlinear functions. Then, the mean and covariance are recalculated back from the
propagated points, yielding more accurate results compared to a conventional linearization routine.
Although in the presented work we have adopted UKF as a core estimation framework, similar results
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are expected if the estimation process would have been formulated with an EKF with sufficiently high
update rate [36].
In general, the navigation filter is formulated as a nonlinear estimation problem for the system
governed by the following stochastic models:
xk = f (xk−1, uk, νk) (1)
zk = h (xk, ek) (2)
where xk is the state vector of length n, zk is the vector of observations of length m, uk is the control
input, νk ∼ N (0,Qk) is a zero mean process noise vector, and ek ∼ N (0, Rk) is the observation noise
vector. The f (·) and h (·) are the dynamic models for the state propagation and measurement model,
respectively. Here the noises neither have to be additive nor have to be of the same dimensionality as
xk or zk.
In our work, the vector xk describing the state of the vessel in a 3D space can be expressed as
x =
[
qT vT pT bTa b
T
g
(
dt d˙t
)]T
(3)
where q represents the attitude quaternion from the vessel local to the the earth-centered, earth-fixed
(ECEF) frames, v and p are the 3D velocity and position in the ECEF frame, and ba and bg are the
accelerometer and gyroscope offsets. Finally, for tightly coupled IMU/GNSS integration schemes,
the state has to be augmented with GPS receiver clock offset dt and clock offset rate d˙t. Further, GNSS
clock offsets can be added to the estimated state if a multi-constellation GNSS scenario is considered.
Effective and accurate attitude estimation can be considered as a key component of almost any
higher performance navigation system. Within our implementation, we have explicitly addressed
a challenge of attitude estimation by separating the attitude part (quaternion) and the vector part
of the estimated kinematic state. In the present work, we chose a unit quaternion as the attitude
parametrization due to its computational efficiency, low redundancy, and absence of singularity.
The unit quaternion, although consisting of four numbers, is deprived of one degree of freedom due
to its unit norm constraint and, therefore, requires a special treatment within the framework of the
UKF [37]. Except for the interesting part of quaternion handling, the rest of the process model follows
a classical strapdown inertial mechanization approach for higher performance systems [23] and is
formulated in the ECEF frame.
There are several options to construct the measurement models depending on the configuration
of the filter. For a loosely coupled approach, a snapshot least-square adjustment is applied to estimate
the position and velocity of the vessel. In the case of a classical code-based GNSS positioning,
a time-of-arrival concept is employed to determine the receiver position from the measured code
pseudoranges of the satellites in view. The positioning principle is based on solving a geometric
problem from the measured ranges to the set of visible satellites with known coordinates [38].
The ionosphere corrections are estimated using the Klobuchar empirical model, while the Saastamonien
model is applied for estimating the tropospheric corrections. Similarly, the Doppler shift of the GNSS
signals can be used to compute the velocity and the clock offset rate of the receiver.
Note that at least four satellites have to be visible in order to solve explicitly for both the position
and the velocity in loosely coupled architecture. If there are fewer than four satellites visible at a
given epoch, no solution can be found and the GNSS measurement step of the loosely coupled filter
has to be skipped. An alternative approach, also known as tightly coupled integration, avoids the
intermediate snapshot position and velocity solutions by applying the code or Doppler measurements
directly in the measurement models of the filter. This strategy puts no inherent restrictions on the
number of satellites available and even fewer than four available measurements could still be employed
to constrain, at least partially, the possible drift of the estimated position. The same holds for the
Doppler GNSS measurements, which can be combined with the GNSS code-ranges to enforce a radial
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velocity measurement over each available link. The mathematical model to relate the pseudorange ρ
and the pseudorange rate ρ˙ to the state estimate is as follows:
ρj = uj
T
(p+ q⊗ lGNSS ⊗ q∗) + c
(
dt− dtj
)
+ Trj + I j + eρj (4)
ρ˙j = uj
T
(
vj − v+ q⊗ (ω× lGNSS)⊗ q∗
)
+ cd˙t+ eρ˙j (5)
where the superscript j refers to the jth GNSS tracked satellite, uj is the unit line-of-sight vector
between the satellite and the receiver, lGNSS represents the baseline between the IMU and the GNSS
antenna expressed in the vessel body frame, c stands for the speed of light, Tr and I gather the
tropospheric and ionospheric effects, respectively, and ω is the angular rate of the vehicle expressed
in the vessel body frame. The operation ⊗ refers to quaternion multiplication. For more details
on quaternion conventions and a comprehensive explanation on quaternion algebra, the authors
recommend consulting [39].
In the case of a loosely coupled integration, an equivalent position solution error covariance
can be calculated by using the geometry matrix from the iterated LS solution and a corresponding
weight matrix, where the weights are assigned following the assumptions regarding the quality of
each link. A simplification, commonly used in practice (and which we actually assume within the
equivalent design of the tightly coupled architecture) is that the measurements from the different
satellites are uncorrelated. The measurement weighting matrix can then be constructed as an inverse of
the diagonal measurement noise covariance matrix. As the GNSS Doppler measurements are usually
of a relatively high quality, a constant noise assumption can be easily adopted with an equivalent
circular covariance approximation for Doppler LS solution in a loosely coupled configuration.
Finally, the DVL measurement model can be considered as the X–Y velocity measurement in
the coordinate frame of the sensor including the lever arm compensation with respect to the IMU.
In addition to the actual 2D velocity measurement, a constraint along the body vertical axis of the
vessel can be employed (velocity projection in the body frame) as one can assume the vertical velocity
to be zero on average. The constraint has been implemented within the UKF framework as so-called
“pseudo-measurement” by extending the true sensor measurement with a third component, setting the
measurement to zero with some associated measurement noise. This vertical velocity measurement
significantly decreases the vertical position drift by reducing it from being cubic in time to becoming
quasi-linear in time. The measurement model for the DVL speed observation vDVL is expressed as
vDVL = q∗ ⊗ v⊗ q+ω× lDVL + eDVL (6)
where lDVL refers to the baseline between the IMU and the DVL positions within the local ship frame.
Naturally, for lower-cost IMUs the navigation performance is strongly degraded due to a
fast accumulation of the errors caused by sensor noises, biases, scale factor errors, etc. Moreover,
for non-augmented IMU/GNSS system (e.g., a system without the magnetometer, a gyrocompass,
or multiple GNSS antennas), the attitude and some of the inertial sensor errors become weakly
observable, and the ability of the system to effectively estimate them is strongly conditioned on
the dynamics of the vessel. For these reasons, the baseline observations (non-collinear vector
measurements) were incorporated from three spatially distributed GNSS antennas to ensure that
the attitude drift is constrained when baseline measurements are available. Recall that the attitude
integration is the first integral of three subsequent integrals, which constitute the strapdown inertial
mechanization and the attitude errors start to dominate the other error sources relatively fast.
A baseline observation is considered to be valid if the RTK-based baseline determination between two
antennas resulted in a fixed integer ambiguity solution; therefore, up to three baseline observations
can be incorporated into the measurement model at each epoch depending on the quality of the RTK
solutions. Here, baseline estimation is realized in a loosely coupled manner, following the methodology
presented in [40]. Nonetheless, heading determination can be also tightly coupled to the positioning
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problem for a higher exploitation of redundant information [41]. The advantage of a direct baseline
vector observation model is that the heading becomes observable even with a single observation of
non-vertical baseline (i.e., the baseline non-collinear with the local Earth gravity vector). Note that
both pitch and roll angles are effectively observable via the coupling of the position measurements
with the Earth gravity and only the heading information cannot be directly determined with a single
GNSS antenna for typically limited vessel dynamics.
4. Setup and Measurement Campaign
In order to enable experimental jamming tests under real life maritime conditions, the DLR
in cooperation with the German Federal Network Agency has allocated a civilian maritime GNSS
jamming testbed in the Baltic Sea. The test area is located approximately 10 km North of the Darß
Peninsula (see Figure 1). The measurement campaign took place in November 2015. A PPD jammer
(WolvesFleet 212G, output power: 2 W) was mounted on the monkey deck of the tugboat AARON
(length 26 m, beam 8 m) (see Figure 2). During the campaign, the AARON was anchored in the center
of the jamming test area, keeping a fixed position and heading. Due to waves (wave height: 1–2 m),
the roll and pitch angle of the vessel varied significantly.
Figure 1. An overview of the civilian maritime jamming test area 10 km north of Peninsula Darß
(54,5474 N, 12,8154 E).
Figure 2. AARON with the jammer mounted on the monkey deck.
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The applied PPD jammer was sweeping a continuous wave signal with an update rate of ∼10 µs
around the GPS L1 frequency covering a bandwidth of 17 MHz (see Figure 3) affecting both GPS L1
and Galileo E1 signal tracking, while GLONASS L1 mainly remained unaffected. This allowed us
to use GLONASS for the calculation of a Precise Point Positioning (PPP) reference trajectory using
RTKLib software [42] even in the direct vicinity of the jammer.
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Figure 3. Power spectral density of the used PPD jammer.
The measurement equipment was installed on BALTIC TAUCHER II, the multipurpose research
and diving vessel (length 29 m, beam 7 m, see Figure 4), which was navigated around the tugboat
AARON with a maximum speed of 8 knots and a distance to the jammer varying from ∼50 m to
4000 m. The vessel was equipped with three separate dual frequency GNSS receivers (type: Javad Delta,
antenna type: navXperience 3G+C maritime), a FOG IMU (type Imar IMU FCAI, list of specifications
at [43]), a gyrocompass, and a DVL (type: Furuno DS 60, list of specifications at [44]). All relevant
sensor measurements were provided either directly via Ethernet or via serial to Ethernet adapter to
a Box PC where the measurements were processed in real-time and in parallel stored in a SQlite3
database along with the corresponding time stamps. The described setup enables record and replay
functionality for further processing of the original sensor data. The system consists of a highly modular
hardware platform and a Real-Time software Framework implemented in ANSI - C++ as described
in [45].
Figure 4. BALTIC TAUCHER II with the mounting of the antennas.
5. Results
Within the first part of this section, the results of the lab jamming experiment are shown.
The experiment was used to investigate the validity of the adaptive range noise models in
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jamming scenarios. In the second part of the section, we demonstrate the performance of the hybrid
IMU/DVL/GNSS navigation system under real jamming conditions using both the classical GNSS
measurement noise model as well as the adaptive noise model, as described in Section 5.1.
5.1. Lab Experiment
For the lab experiment, an antenna receiver setup identical to the one of the maritime jamming
measurement campaign described in Section 4 was used. The antenna has been mounted on the
roof of the DLR office building in Neustrelitz (Germany). In Figure 5, the schematic overview of the
experimental setup is given. One receiver (type Javad Delta) was acting as a reference using only
the original GNSS signals from the antenna. As an input for the other receiver, a combined signal
from the same GNSS antenna and the jammer was used. The antenna output of the jammer was
connected using a HF cable, and an attenuated jamming signal was merged with the original GNSS
signal. The jammer together with the attenuator and the GNSS signal combiner were placed in a
shielding box ensuring that no measurable jamming radiation could be detected outside the laboratory.
For each experiment, a 48 h (February 2017) measurement data with a 2 Hz update rate have been
recorded. Two jamming scenarios were investigated with a total attenuation of 53 dB (Scenario A) and
42 dB (Scenario B), respectively.
Jammer Variable Attenuator 
GNSS Signal 
Splitter 
GNSS Signal 
Combiner 
Receiver I 
Receiver II 
Shielding Box 
Figure 5. A schematic overview of the setup used in laboratory conditions.
In Figure 6, the impact of the jamming signal on the correlation between the carrier-to-noise
density ratio (CN0) and the elevation angle is shown. For the unjammed reference, the mean of CN0
values varies approximately between 40 dBHz @ 5◦ elevation angle and 57 dBHz @ 90◦ elevation
angle. For Scenario A, the 2D density distribution is shifted by approximately –10 dBHz, and fewer
low elevation satellites are tracked. For Scenario B, the 2D density distribution is shifted again by
approximately –10 dBHz (compared to Scenario A) and mainly higher elevation satellites remain
visible. This corresponds fairly well with the difference of 11 dB of the attenuation of the jamming
signal between Scenarios A and B. In Scenario B, only satellites above ∼30◦ elevation are tracked by
the receiver, resulting in only 4–5 satellites at each point in time. From the comparison of the three
graphs in Figure 6, one can deduce that, for that receiver, a rather soft CN0 threshold for the tracking
of the satellites exists, which lies between 25 and 30 dBHz. In the absence of jamming, low-elevation
satellites show a signal strength gain of approximately 10 dBHz, compared to the signal strength under
the effects of a jamming attack.
In order to determine the pseudorange statistics, the antenna position as well as the receiver clock
offset of the reference was determined by a static precise point positioning (PPP) calculation with
the RTKLib software [42] in post-processing using precise satellite orbit and clock information from
the IGS service. The pseudorange errors were calculated as the difference between the expected and
the observed ranges using broadcast ionospheric and tropospheric corrections (the same corrections
which have been used within the filter design in Part 2 of this section) while taking into account the
receiver clock offset from the PPP solution. The obtained data were binned according to the associated
CN0 as measured by the receiver or to the elevation values, and for each bin a standard deviation
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was determined. Note that in this simplified approach we focus only on the standard deviation of the
distribution and ignore the non-zero mean offset. However, pseudorange biases, which vary within
the evaluated time span of 48 h, ultimately will also contribute to the calculated standard deviation.
20 40 60 80 
Elevation angle in [°] 
20 40 60 80 
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20 40 60 80 
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 z ]
 
Jamming B Jamming A Reference 
5 5 5 
Figure 6. 2D histogram plot of carrier-to-noise density ratio (CN0) versus elevation angle without
jamming (left); for Scenario A (middle) and Scenario B (right).
In Figure 7, the standard deviation of the errors is plotted against the elevation angle for both
the original (no jamming) and for the two jamming scenarios. The crosses mark data points with
an underlying test statistic including more than 1000 pseudorange errors, and the small dots mark
data points with a sample population fewer than 1000 data points for that bin. The unjammed
reference data show expected behavior, with increasing standard deviation for decreasing elevation
angles. The measurements affected by the jamming signal show comparable behavior with fewer
measurements for low elevation angles but only slightly overall increased standard deviations.
Interestingly, the effect of the jamming signal on the standard deviation of the pseudorange
measurements is rather minor, and this seems to be counterintuitive compared to the expected behavior
of a typical receiver in the presence of a jammer. For the highest jamming signal power, only an increase
by a factor of about 1.3 for the standard deviation can be observed. As an overbound for all data,
including both jamming scenarios, the following functional dependence of the standard deviation σ
and the elevation angle α was determined (see Figure 7):
σ = A× (sin(α))−B (7)
with A = 0.85 m and B = 0.6. Elevation-dependent functions have often been applied in geodetic
applications for expressing the expected noise of GNSS observations [46,47]. Finding the unknown
parameters A and B constitutes a nonlinear regression problem, solved here by applying a least-squares
adjustment. In Figure 8, for the same measurements as in Figure 7, the standard deviation as a function
of the CN0 is shown. Interestingly, in the absence of the jammer, the reference data show an almost
linear dependency on CN0. A linear fit leads to a slope of a = −0.06 m/dBHz and an offset of
b = 3.95 m. This linear dependency is different from a suggested exponential dependency as reported
in literature [48,49]. To some extent, this could be explained by a new firmware of the receiver and
a different antenna used compared to our previous work [49]. Comparing the curve for Scenario A
with the scenario without jamming, mainly a parallel shift towards smaller CN0 values without a
significant increased pseudorange error can be found. This finding is consistent with the analysis of
Figures 6 and 7. Furthermore, the curve for Scenario B is mainly shifted towards smaller CN0 values;
it also starts at slightly higher standard deviations for the pseudorange error (the right-most end of the
line starts at a higher error value with increasing jammer power), and error deviation increases faster
with decreasing CN0 values.
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Figure 7. Measured dependency of the pseudorange error statistics (standard deviation) on the
elevation angle in the lab experiment.
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Figure 8. Recorded dependency of the pseudorange error statistics on the receiver reported CN0 value
for lab experiment.
Summarizing the results of Figure 8, one can conclude that, for the used receiver, the functional
dependency of the standard deviation of the pseudorange error on the carrier-to-noise density, as is
observed for the unjammed scenario, is rather an indirect correlation. The receiver tracking noise
error, which should strongly depend on CN0, is small compared to other dominating errors, such as
iononspheric, tropospheric, and multipath errors, at least for CN0 > 40 dBHz. For the usage of
pseudorange measurements within a tightly coupled KF, this leads to an unexpected conclusion that a
CN0-based weighting scheme, calibrated for the unjammed scenario, could result in overestimation of
the pseudorange errors in the vicinity of a jammer.
Interestingly, the main impact of the applied sweeping PPD jammer on the used geodetic receiver
is the reduction of the number of tracked satellites, while the pseudorange error statistics is only
slightly effected. As expected, the receiver’s reported CN0 directly correlates with the applied jamming
signal strength. Therefore, the dependency of the CN0 on the elevation angle is a good candidate
for an indicator of the presence of a jamming signal in the environment. Of course, as the CN0
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dependency is setup-specific, the relationship between the reported CN0 and the elevation angle has
to be determined for each sensor configuration separately. The main motivation for the lab experiment
was the determination of an appropriate pseudorange variance model in the presence of a jammer.
One can conclude that, first of all, the constant noise model as the simplest possible model with a
standard deviation of 2 m and uncorrelated observations is a good candidate for application in the
hybrid navigation filter. Furthermore, the CN0-based variance model would not be significantly
superior to a constant noise model as it overestimates the pseudorange errors in the presence of a
jammer. Finally, the elevation-based GNSS measurement model seems to be a better candidate than
the CN0 model in the case of the jamming as the reported noise statistics depends only slightly on the
jamming power.
Still, an optimal pseudorange variance model could include both the dependence on elevation
angle and the CN0. Such a model could in general be determined with an experimental setup used in
this lab experiment but would require a far more detailed analysis and will be a subject of future work.
5.2. Results of the Maritime Jamming Campaign
5.2.1. GPS Single Point Positioning Results
Figure 9 provides an overview of GPS Single Point Positioning (SPP) results for the analyzed
time frame of nearly two hours for all three antennas/receivers on board the BALTIC TAUCHER II.
During this time, the vessel BALTIC TAUCHER II passed the vessel AARON (the vessel with the
jammer installed) several times with increasing passing distances, as shown Figure 9a. For the entire
time, except during the turning maneuvers, the PPD jammer was activated. The idea behind the
deactivation of the jammer during the turning maneuvers was to start each passing of the jammer under
undisturbed and, therefore, repeatable conditions. Although the turning maneuvers were performed
at a distance of more than three kilometers, the on/off switching of the jammer is clearly visible from
the reported maximum CN0 values, as shown in Figure 9b. When the jammer was switched off,
between 9 and 11 GPS satellites have been tracked, as is easily seen in Figure 9c. At the points of
maximum separation between the two vessels, the horizontal positioning error of approximately 2 m
had been achieved with geometric dilution of precision (GDOP) values between 1 and 2 for all three
antennas and receivers. Therefore, with the sufficient separation from the jammer, the positioning
performance lies in the expected range of non-augmented code-based SPP. Note that the zone where
pure GPS-positioning is prevented by the jammer is not easy to clearly define (see Figure 9f). The places
where GPS positioning is possible already vary significantly between the three antennas. Additionally,
a dependency on whether one is approaching the jammer or is veering away is observed. Obviously,
in the former case, the GPS position solution is available on a smaller distance to the jammer when
compared to the latter one. This, however, is not too surprising due to the signal acquisition and
tracking mechanisms, as implemented by a typical commercial receiver. Usually, keeping track of a
satellite can be performed under CN0 conditions inferior to those of the acquisition of a new satellite.
Moreover, a relatively large variability in the impact of the jammer on the CN0 value can also be
found in Figure 9b. The observed behavior can be, at least to some extent, explained by the specific
experimental conditions. The jammer was mounted on the vessel AARON at a height comparable to
the GPS antenna on the test vessel. As the jamming signal was coupling into the antenna at nearly
zero degree elevation, the impact of the jamming signal strongly varied with the elevation angle
(≈0.25dB/◦). During the experiment, the Baltic Sea was quite rough (wave heights between 1 and 2 m)
so that the vessel was rolling and pitching significantly. The variations in roll and pitch angles of the
vessel translate directly to the variations in the effective elevation of the jammer with respect to the
GPS antenna body frame and, hence, into the variations of the power of the injected jamming signal.
Besides this, the mounting of the GPS antenna, which was not on the topmost position of the vessel
(see Figure 4), could cause shadowing effects of the jamming signal by structures of the vessel itself
depending on the trajectory segment.
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Figure 9. An overview of GPS positioning results of the three antennas/receivers onboard the vessel
BALTIC TAUCHER II during the measurement campaign in the Baltic Sea, 2 October 2015 at UTC
6:28–8:18: (a) distance of the BALTIC TAUCHER II to the jammer on board the vessel AARON;
(b) maximum receiver reported CN0 of the tracked satellites; (c) total number of tracked satellites;
(d) geometric dilution of precision (GDOP); (e) horizontal positioning error of GPS SPP (when GPS
solution available, i.e., N > 4) (HPE); (f) reference trajectory of BALTIC TAUCHER II (black line) and
GPS SPP results of the three antennas + receivers in the local navigation frame of vessel AARON.
A careful analysis of Figure 9d,e reveal that large position errors seem to happen only when GDOP
is large (i.e., GDOP > 5). This could also be confirmed by analyzing the dependency of the HPE on the
GDOP during these two hours. In Figure 10, the mean HPE is plotted with the GDOP. The statistics
here include all measurements from all three antennas during the analyzed 2 h time span. In order to
account for the fact that large GDOP values are less frequently observed, the bin size for large GDOP
values has been enlarged accordingly. In Figure 10, a relatively good correlation between HPE and
GDOP can be found. This also confirms the observation of the lab experiment in the first part of this
section, where we have demonstrated that the impact of the applied PPD jammer on the employed
geodetic receiver is mainly caused by the reduction of the number of tracked satellites. A reduced
number of satellites leads to a worse satellite geometry (larger GDOP), and this correspondingly causes
larger positioning errors even in the case of the same baseline noise level on each link. Although the
noise level on the range measurements is also affected by the presence of the jammer, this effect can be
considered minor compared to that caused by a worsened GDOP.
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5.2.2. Tightly and Loosely Coupled UKF Results
After the discussion of the GPS single point positioning results in the last paragraph, now the
results of both loosely and tightly coupled UKF using GPS, IMU, and Doppler velocity log (DVL),
as introduced in Section 3, will be analyzed. In this section, we focus on positioning results using the
constant noise model as the simplest possible measurement model for the GPS measurements, with a
comparison of the results of the different noise models provided afterward.
In Figure 11, the positioning results are presented for an example of 8 min time span with >3 min
when no SPP solution can be obtained (portside antenna, around 6:50 UTC (see Figure 9), as the
number of satellites drops temporarily below four due to the proximity to the jammer. The GPS
outage starts after a segment with an already relatively bad GDOP due to a decreased number of
satellites, as can be seen from the HPE for the pure GPS SPP solution between t = 1 and t = 2 min.
Both tightly and loosely coupled UKFs show good smoothing behavior within the first 2 min of
that segment and keep their horizontal positioning error significantly below 2 m. Within the time
interval, when the number of satellites drops below four, the loosely coupled UKF starts to drift away
linearly, while the tightly coupled UKF still nicely follows the vessel track, keeping the HPE below 2 m.
This example is an excellent demonstration of a great advantage of a tightly coupled architecture when
compared to a simpler loosely coupled technique in a real application scenario, where the pseudorange
measurements are exploited even in the case where fewer then four satellites are available. For the
loosely coupled UKF, the drift during the GNSS outage is apparently linear in time. This is expected
when a classical GNSS/IMU integration is augmented with the velocity measurements (DVL can be
seen as an odometer). This proves to be a great advantage of DVL augmentation when compared to a
more classical IMU/GNSS approach, where inertial sensors typically show position drift to be cubic
in time.
In Figure 12 the positioning results are shown for the complete scenario (approximately 2 h).
In order to evaluate the UKF with the most challenging scenario, we have used here the GPS
measurements from the midship antenna, which showed the largest GPS single point positioning
errors (see Figure 9). During the first passing of the jammer, both tightly and loosely coupled filter
showed a comparable performance with the number of the tracked satellites dropping very fast to
one or even to zero satellites. In this challenging case the position solution of a tightly coupled UKF
also shows a linear drift exactly due to the same reason as the loosely coupled UKF described above.
Apparently, an available single range measurement is not sufficient to constrain the estimated position
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of the filter. This could be, at least to some extent, explained by the fact that both the position and the
receiver clock offset have to be estimated. An interesting idea for a future measurement campaign
would be to investigate the performance gain of a tightly coupled UKF when a more stable Rubidium
oscillator is used as the reference of the receiver’s clock.
During the second jammer passing, the number of tracked satellites varies several times
around four, with a maximum of 6 and a minimum of 0 satellites. Here, the tightly coupled filter still
shows some advantages, although the loosely coupled filter performs reasonably well.
The largest difference between the filters can be observed during the third passing of the jammer.
During that time span with a GPS outage, for a short period of time, four satellites were tracked.
The GDOP for this four satellite constellation is larger than 50 (outside the scale of Figure 9d), and
the largest positioning errors (HPE ≈ 200 m) occur. Here, the positioning error of the tightly coupled
filter clearly stays below 20 m, while the loosely coupled filter results in positioning errors up to
50 m. The advantage of the tightly coupled filter is clearly visible. In the loosely coupled filter
regime, the uncertainty in state estimate is growing during the time without GPS position updates;
therefore, the new GPS positions, containing the large errors, will lead to a relatively high weight in
the Kalman gain. In contrast to that, for the tightly coupled filter for almost all times, pseudorange
measurements from at least two satellites are available and limit the uncertainty in the filter state.
Therefore, the tightly coupled filter performs better in this challenging scenario. For the fourth passing
of the jammer, the performance of both filters is roughly comparable with slight advantages of the
tightly coupled configuration.
The linear drift of the tightly coupled UKF and loosely coupled UKF for the starboard and midship
antenna (see Figures 11 and 12), when no GPS measurements are available, seem to be mainly induced
by a rather constant course over ground (COG) error to the starboard side. Estimating the COG
error, which causes an 18 m drift over a time period of approximately 4 min, assuming a velocity of
approximately 5 m/s , results in ∆COG ≈ 0.8◦. Possible root causes for this COG error are random
noise measurement errors in the GNSS compass baseline vector determination, misalignment of the
GNSS compass, measurement errors of the Doppler velocity log (DVL), and modeling errors and
possible misalignment of the DVL. Because of the observed rather constant COG error, the contributions
from the misalignment, of both the GNSS compass and the DVL with respect to the ship body frame,
require further investigation. For a GNSS compass with a relatively short baseline of 1.2 m, as used in
the described setup, an error of the surveyed position of the GNSS antennas of 2 cm could potentially
lead to the observed 0.8◦ error. For the DVL, the alignment error directly translates into a COG error.
Note that, to display the actual vessel speed (the main application of the DVL), a misalignment of 1◦ is
fully acceptable. Nevertheless, it could have a significant impact on the positioning solution in a hybrid
navigation system. Although the constant COG error can be removed by a manual misalignment
adjustment, further options could include a simultaneous estimation of the misalignment parameters
along with the kinematic state of the ship. Although conceptually beautiful, this approach is not
guaranteed to converge, especially bearing in mind fairly limited dynamics of the vessel in typical
application scenarios. Nevertheless, the achieved position performance of the tightly coupled UKF in
the presented measurement campaign, where the PPD jammer was passed several times in varying
distances, with HPE ≤ 30 m can be considered sufficient for basic maritime applications.
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Figure 11. An example of the performance of the hybrid IMU/GNNS/DVL system during the time
when fewer than four satellites are available: segment overview (left); number of available satellites
(top right); and the HPE (bottom right).
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Figure 12. The performance of the hybrid IMU/GNSS/DVL system during the complete measurement
scenario using the midship GPS antenna: overview (left); number of available satellites (top right);
and the HPE (bottom right).
5.2.3. Comparison of Different Weighting Models
The UKF results as presented above were all processed using a constant noise variance model
for the GPS measurements. Here we will compare the positioning results of the tightly coupled
solutions using different pseudorange variance models. For this purpose, we have processed the same
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measurement data three times using the GPS measurements from the midship antenna. The results of
the constant noise error model are the ones from Figure 12. In Table 1, the positioning performance of
the tightly coupled UKF using the three different noise models is compared. Only small differences
between the models are found, as all the three models perform reasonable well. The elevation
depended noise model shows the best results, especially in the maximum HPE. The results of the
constant noise model and the CN0 weighting model are almost identical. These results support the
results from the lab experiment of Section 5.1. The rather small differences in the positioning results
of the three models are surprising. This might result from the fact that, due to the usage of a FOG
IMU combined with the DVL, the filter is remarkably robust and therefore is less sensitive to the GPS
pseudorange measurements.
Table 1. Positioning results of the tightly coupled UKF using different noise models.
Noise Model 95% HPE [m] 99% HPE [m] Max. HPE [m]
Elev. model 10.1 17.7 23.3
CN0 model 10.6 21.2 27.0
Const. noise 10.6 21.2 26.9
6. Summary
In this paper, a hybrid navigation system is introduced using GNSS, inertial, and DVL
measurements. For the first time, such a hybrid navigation system was evaluated in a real maritime
jamming scenario. For the measurement campaign conducted in the civilian jamming testbed in the
Baltic Sea, a Personal Privacy Device (PPD) jammer was installed on a moored vessel. A second vessel,
equipped with three separately placed GNSS antennas and receivers, an inertial measurement unit
(IMU), and a Doppler velocity log (DVL) passed the jammer several times with varying distances.
The influence of the jammer on the three antennas varied significantly, with the GPS single point
positioning being partially disrupted up to a distance of approximately 3 km and corresponding
positioning errors up to 200 m.
A successful usage of GPS pseudorange measurements under challenging jamming conditions is
only possible if the measurements still follow assumed test statistics within the sensor fusion algorithm.
In order to determine the pseudorange error statistic under a jammed condition, a lab experiment was
performed, where the output of a GNSS antenna was merged with the signal of an attenuated PPD
jammer before being fed to a GNSS receiver. The analysis of this experiment shows that, as expected,
the carrier-to-noise density (CN0) decreases with increasing jamming power, and the number of
tracked satellites is therefore significantly reduced. Unexpected is the fact that the standard deviation
of the pseudorange error is only slightly increased by the jammer. A CN0-based variance model,
which is typically assumed to be the best model, substantially overestimates the error in the presence
of a jammer. Out of this analysis, a standard elevation-based noise model or even a constant noise
model appear to be good candidates for the application in the sensor fusion scheme.
The evaluation of the proposed IMU/GNSS/DVL UKF within the challenging jamming scenario
confirmed the superior performance of the tightly coupled approach when compared to the loosely
coupled scheme. Here, the advantage of the tightly coupled UKF is mainly due to a direct usage of
the measurements in the segments affected by the jamming, where the number of tracked satellite
drops partially below four. Due to the usage of the DVL, the filter shows only a linear position drift
during complete GPS outages. This can be seen as a substantial advantage when compared to classical
GNSS/IMU integration, where the positioning error grows cubically in time due to triple integration
of the gyroscope errors in a strapdown navigation system. The analysis of the different weighting
schemes for the GPS pseudorange measurements inside the UKF yielded rather small differences
between the approaches. The best performance was achieved using the elevation-based variance
model and, therefore, confirms the results of the lab experiment. The maximum horizontal position
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error of less than 30 meters of the tightly coupled IMU/GNSS/DVL UKF for the challenging jamming
environment is small enough to successfully support most of the maritime applications.
Future work will deal with the reduction of the observed constant linear drift of 5 m/min by trying
to align better the DVL and GNSS compass or, alternatively, considering a constant alignment error
within the estimator. Additionally, the simultaneous usage of the measurements from all three antennas
and the performance of the filter with available stable reference clock will be explored. With respect to
the pseudorange error model in the vicinity of jammer, we will extend the lab experiment in order
to calibrate an error model based on both the elevation and carrier-to-noise density ratio. Finally,
an appropriate error model for the GNSS Doppler measurements needs to be developed.
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